The RSA cryptographic algorithm is widely used in data protection and electronic business. One of the most important parameter of the achieved level of security is the quality of the generated cryptographic keys with which the algorithm is applied. In this paper a few cases in which poorly generated RSA cryptographic keys caused dis-accreditation of the system are described. The recommendations and checks that must be fulfilled during generation of RSA algorithm cryptographic keys are formulated in order that keys were considered safe for implement on.
INTRODUCTION
Th e level of data protection achieved by the application of cryptographic algorithm in data protection mostly depends, on the quality of the cryptographic algorithm and the quality of the applied cryptographic key. Th e signifi cance and role of the applied cryptographic algorithm is indisputable and clear. Th e role and signifi cance of the applied cryptographic key is oft en overlooked. In the case of using the RSA cryptographic algorithm, we will show the role and signifi cance of the quality of the applied cryptographic key to the security of data that are protected.
Th e cryptographic algorithm RSA, [1] , is one of the cryptographic cornerstones of protection in information systems and e-commerce. It belongs to the class of computationally secure cryptographic algorithms based on the complexity of the problem of factorization of natural numbers.
Th e RSA algorithm is defi ned by natural numbers , , , n p q e and d which meet the following requirements: 
Decryption takes place as follows
Th e RSA algorithm belongs to the class of computationally secure cryptographic algorithms, which means that its parameters must have appropriate characteristics so that messages protected by this algorithm have the desired level of security. Th e RSA algorithm's security rests on ignorance of effi cient ways to factorize large natural numbers, and in order to achieve security in practical terms its parameters must have appropriate characteristics. Bearing in mind that in order to achieve a minimum security level, when applying the RSA algorithm, it is required that the length of parameters p and q, marked with p and q , respectively, Th e cryptographic algorithm RSA is most oft en used to create an electronic signature and an electronic envelope.
From the point of view of the safety of the generic RSA algorithm, the primary role is played by attacks that reconstruct the secret key ( ) , n d . In this context; attacks can be grouped according to the methods used to achieve this goal:
◆ Algorithms for factorization of the RSA algorithm module ◆ Characteristics of the applied public and secret key ◆ Properties induced by the method of implementing the RSA algorithm Details can be founded in [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] .
IMPACT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS
Th e importance of cryptographic keys for safe use of cryptographic algorithms was detected at the end of the nineteenth century and formulated as the Kerckhoff 's principle. According to Kerckhoff 's principle, [7] the security of each cryptographic system rests with a good cryptographic algorithm on the assumption that its keys are generated in a random way and are unknown to the opponent. Th e following examples illustrate what can happen in data protection systems when this principle is not respected.
Non random values from certifi ed true random number generator
Th e fi rst example concerns the system for access to electronic state and commercial services in Taiwan, the analysis presented in [8] .
Each user has a smart card called the "Citizen Digital Certifi cate card" with his electronic certifi cate issued by the appropriate accredited certifi cation body and which is used for identifi cation, authentication and authorization when using electronic services. As an algorithm for creating an electronic signature, the RSA is used and its keys are generated on a smart card with a built-in random number generator that has a FIPS 140-2 certifi cate level 2. In [8] , the authors analyzed the quality of the generated modules, number n in the description of the RSA algorithm, on a sample of two million issued electronic certifi cates. Module size in the analyzed cases is 1024 bits. Th e authors said that in a given sample they successfully factored 184 modules. A number of modules, 103 of them, are factorized due to the fact that some of them had a common prime factor, and the remaining detection of repetition forms that occur when generating prime numbers in this system. Th e two most common factors detected in the analysis are given in the following equations. 
Th e factor (3) indicated by p appears forty-six times, and the factor (4) indicated by q appears seven times in the one hundred and three cases.
Th e presented results of the conducted analysis indicate the possibility of identity theft and phishing in electronic commerce. A rough estimate is that in the analyzed system, one identity can be stolen on every ten thousand issued electronic identities, which is not at all harmless and incomparably greater than the probability that the theory recognizes as a danger in the case of good random generators. Similar analyzes for other environments and their results are given in papers [9] , [10] .
Th ese results indicate that the probable cause of the problem is the generator of random numbers on the smart cards as the theoretical analysis shows that the probability of the event is negligible. Namely, probability that two randomly generated modules 1 2 , n n of the RSA algorithm have a common factor, ( )
, is approximately equal
On the other hand, the appearance of the bit pattern in the generated prime numbers, the numbers p and q, points to the possible multiple use of the random sequence generated for prime number candidates.
Non random prime number generation from pseudoraandom number generator
In the paper [11] , the authors analyzed the statistical properties of the RSA algorithm key generated by various soft ware libraries for this purpose. Th e result of their analysis showed that it is possible to detect with high probability the library by which the sample of RSA public keys is generated. Th at analysis showed that the keys generated by the Infi neon RSA Library version v1.02.013 have signifi cant deviation from the uniform distribution for events ( ) mod p x and ( ) mod n x when x is a small prime number. Th is result was intrigued by another group of researchers who came up with the idea of trying to factor RSA keys obtained in this way.
In the fi rst step they found that all the prime numbers generated by this library have a form
Wherein M is a product of the fi rst N prime numbers, i.e. 
65537 mod 65537 mod
Coppersmith method, [12] , is used for factorization. Th e method can be used for factoring RSA modules when one number of the high bits of one factor is known, [11] .
In this case, the idea is as following.
Denote the order of the element 65537 in the group
Since the system is designed for factorization of the modules in the form (8), the fi rst step is to determine are the modules of desired shape. Th is is achieved by the following analysis ( ) Using this algorithm, the RSA keys obtained by Infi neon RSA Library version v1.02.013, it is possible to factorize effi ciently modules of lengths 512 and 1024 bits, and special cases of keys 2048 and 4096 bits long.
Details and more effi cient algorithms can be found in the [11] .
Special properties of the prime numbers usage
In this case, we will consider one feature of RSA algorithm.
We call the message m fi xed point relative to the RSA algorithm with parameters , , , n p q e and d if it is satisfi ed that mod e m m n =
i.e. encryption does not change message. For each selection of parameters , , , n p q e and d there are fi xed point messages but their number varies depending on the selected p, q and e. Th is can be a problem when implementing a digital envelope system Digital envelope is a key distribution technique for symmetric cryptographic algorithms in which the data are encrypted by symmetric cryptographic algorithm, for example AES, and the key used is encrypted by the RSA algorithm public key of the recipient. Both cipher texts are sent to the recipient and he fi rst decrypts the key with the secret RSA key and the RSA algorithm, then decrypts the received message with the AES algorithm.
For RSA algorithm with parameters , , , n p q e and d the number of fi xed point messages, NP, is given by the term 
Th is results in the one who implements the system and controls the procedures for generating keys for the RSA algorithm can control the number of fi xed point messages and thus compromise the system, for example according to [13] , by stating that the generated parameters satisfy the following relations: Controlling the size of the numbers m and n the attacker can adjust the security of the system with its attacking capabilities.
If one uses a digital envelope technique by combining, for example, a 256-bit AES algorithm and RSA algorithm with a 2048-bit key, its security would, at fi rst glance, be respectable. However, if the parameters for RSA generated as in the previous examples, it would practically not be protected.
In case of the parameters , , p q e are randomly chosen, the probability that the randomly selected message is fi xed point message is approximately ( ) 3 ln / n n which is negligible considering the size of the number n .
GENERATING RSA KEY
In part I the RSA algorithm defi nition is given. As we mentioned in introduction the RSA algorithm's security rests on the fact that there is no effi cient ways to factorize large natural numbers, and in order to achieve security in practical terms its parameters must have appropriate size. So, selection of parameters must ensure that the modulus of specifi c RSA algorithm has a size that prevents effi cient factoring.
Module size n p q = ⋅ satisfi es
Have a security parameter k given, and k p q = = then the number 2k represents the level of security of the RSA algorithm.
Practical algorithms for generating RSA keys and their consequences
Having in mind the description given in I parameters , p q are randomly selected from a set of prime numbers. Th is choice is most oft en carried out in three steps:
1. A random number of length k is generated using a random number generator 2. Check its length (zeroes which are not signifi cant digits are not counted) which must be k.
3. Check that the generated number is prime number.
Each of these steps takes some time.
If a good random generator is used to be a random choice of k bits get the number of length k is 1/ 2 Th e probability of randomly selected number from the interval ( ) roughly speaking means more than a thousand and four hundred attempts to make one successful. What further aggravates the situation is the fact that deterministic algorithms to determine if the number is prime takes long time, and, in the previous example, this type of check will occur with more than one thousand and four candidates.
Such a purely theoretical approach is ineffi cient for mass application, and in practice, various modifi cations are used to increase effi ciency. do not distort the randomness of the selection because the selection process is such that candidates who do not meet the requirements of those items were certainly rejected.
Th erefore, the basic, potential source of problems with RSA keys originates from generating random sequences on two grounds:
◆ Th e quality of the random generator ◆ How to use generated random sequences in the process of generating RSA keys.
In part II, we saw examples of both situations.
Instructions for generating RSA keys
In accordance with the previous one, regarding the level of security that RSA off ers, the fi rst factor in order is the quality and length of the generated keys. We have seen in that some of the properties of the generated elements can be such as to dis-accredit the system in which they are used. In order to avoid such situations in the process of generating keys for the RSA algorithm, a standard representation, it is necessary to adhere to certain rules:
1. Th e random number generator generating candidates for prime numbers must be thoroughly tested and reliable. Sequences representing candidates must be selected independently.
2. Every prime number p length k can be used up to a maximum of once.
3. For every prime number p length k numbers , [15] .
Th e above-mentioned rules are technically more detailed in international standards. Recommendations related to random and pseudo-random generators can be found in [16] , [17] and [18] .
Recommendations on the method of forming candidates for random numbers, checks of their properties and recommended algorithms for this purpose are given in [19] , [20] and [21] . Th ese recommendations deal with requests related to items with item numbers 3, 4, and 5. Item number 2 is not recorded as necessary due to the insignifi cant probability of occurrence in ideal conditions. As shown in practice, [8] , [10] , [9] and [12] , that this property can be the cause of signifi cant security weaknesses in some situations. Th e authors of the [8] root of this unexpected behavior attributed the inadequate entropy of the applied sources of randomness, although the causes could be covered in the way of implementing the defi ned recommendations.
CONCLUSION
Although by its description and mathematical basics, the RSA algorithm does not require deep mathematical knowledge, it represents one of the cornerstones of security in the computer and networking world. Despite its simplicity, it is not easy to implement it reliably. Th e previous presentation shows the potential weaknesses of the RSA algorithm keys that lead to system discreditation. Th e theory shows that in the case of randomly generating parameters the probability of occurrence of some of these characteristics is negligible, but practice, [8] , [12] shows that even in seemingly verifi ed situations this does not have to be the case.
In addition to the previous choice of parameters, the security of the systems in which the RSA algorithm is applied is signifi cantly infl uenced by the way in which it is implemented and interaction with the rest of the system. Th is can be seen more in [2] , [4] and [6] .
